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The bulk of untapped resources in these countries is well documented. The economy of
Brazil, for example, is based primarily on natural resources. Significantly, Brazil has many
of the largest iron ore deposits on the globe. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN BRAZIL
6 (1980) [hereinafter cited as PRICE WATERHOUSE, BRAZIL]. In fact, the overall amount of
resources known to be located in Brazil in the mid-1970's was described as "huge," and
further exploration continues to unearth new mineral deposits. T. WEIL, J. BLACK, H. BLUT-
STEIN, K. JOHNSTON, D. MCMORRIS, AREA HANDBOOK FOR BRAZIL 329 (3d ed. 1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as T. WEIL]; see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR
LEADERS 263 (5th ed. 1979). Other plentiful resources include: nickel, tin, chromite, baux-
ite, berylium, copper, lead, tungsten, and zinc. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra, at 262.
Importantly, oil and gas deposits have yet to be discovered in major quantities. See PRICE
WATERHOUSE, BRAZIL, supra, at 6. The search for petroleum reserves is significant because
Brazil's monthly expeditures for oil exceed $300,000,000. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra,
at 263.
A similar situation exists in Peru. Peru is blessed with abundant resources; yet the devel-
opment of resource related industries and investment therein has not been dramatic. See
PERU, A COUNTRY STUDY 113 (R. Nyrop, 3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as R. Nyrop]. Re-
garding petroleum, Peru is one of the few countries that has the capacity to be "self-suffi-
cient in oil." PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN PERU 7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU]. In addition, newly discovered oil reserves should generate $80-
$100 million in export revenues. Id. at 7. Forecasts for the mining industry are equally
optomistic. The recent discovery and development of sizable copper mines is expected to
benefit substantially Peru's economy. Other minerals found in Peru include lead, zinc, sil-
ver, iron ore, bismuth, cadmium, tin, gold, antimony, tungsten, manganese, selenium, let-
turim, and mercury. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra, at 824. The Mining sector accounts
for about 54% of total exports, id., and the petroleum industry accounts for about seven
percent. See R. Nyrop, supra, at xv.
Mexico is also endowed with vast resource wealth. The country is best known for its sub-
stantial oil fields. Discoveries of extensive oil fields in southeastern Mexico and in the Gulf
of Mexico permitted Mexico to become self sufficient in oil and to become a major exporter
of petroleum. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO 8-9 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as PRICE WATERHOUSE, MEXICO]. Mexico's other natural resources are well diversified. The
country is a leading producer of sulphur, lead, and zinc and is the world's largest silver
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those resources, minerals are one key that may help each nation
attain a vibrant economy.2 Presently, a trend exists toward increas-
ing foreign investment opportunities in Mexico, Peru, and Brazil.'
Thus, foreign mining ventures which are planned properly theoret-
ically should be lucrative. In Mexico, recent governmental leader-
ship has openly accepted investments of foreign capital, except in
fields reserved for Mexican nationals.4 Current relations between
Peru and the United States are, for the first time since the early
1970's,5 conducive to foreign investment. That investment is pri-
marily concentrated in mining.' Brazil, however, was and remains
the Latin American country most open to United States private
investment.7
producer. Id. at 9; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra, at 70. Moreover, Mexico produces
gold, copper, manganese, coal, and iron ore in significant quantities. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, supra, at 70.
2 See supra note 1; see also STATEMAN'S Y.B. 1980/1981 855, 984 (J. Paxton ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as J. Paxton]; PRICE WATERHOUSE, BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 9; PRICE
WATERHOUSE. PERU, supra note 1, at 7; PRICE WATERHOUSE, MEXICO, supra note 1, at 10. But
see R. Nyrop, supra note 1, at 113, 117, 119 (explaining that in Peru the development of the
mining industry did not progress as quickly as expected and that mining did not increase
ratably with Peru's gross domestic product during the early 1970's).
3 See generally BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN PERU, FOREIGN INCOME PORTFOLIO (BNA) A-5 to
-6 (1981) [hereinafter cited as BNA, PERU].
' PRICE WATERHOUSE, MEXICO, supra note 1, at 16.
' Until recently, investment in Peru was truly a gamble as a result of a coup conducted on
October 3, 1968 in Lima. On that day a group of generals and colonels of the Peruvian
armed forces arrested President Belaunde and exiled him. R. Nyrop, supra note 1, at 39.
The revolution was prompted by nationalistic fervor stemming from an agreement between
the Belaunde government and the International Petroleum Company of Great Britain
(IPC). Id. at 38. The revolutionary forces alleged that the agreement gave currency conces-
sions to the IPC enabling it to obtain excessive profitability. See id. Shortly after the mili-
tary takeover, significant changes in Peruvian business structure were implemented. For ex-
ample, workers received participation in ownership and management of the companies in
which they were employed. General Industries Law, Decree-Law No. 18,350 (1970), re-
printed in BNA, PERU, supra note 2, at A-3. Mining, for example, was one such industry.
General Mining Law, Decree No. 18,880 (1971), reprinted in BNA, PERU, supra note 2, at
A-3. Moreover, the state nationalized private sector industries. Decree Law No. 19,453
(1972), reprinted in BNA,.PERU, supra note 2, at A-3. .. ,
a U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 1, at 825'. Investment is concentrated equally in
petroleum.
7 Sloan, Political Environment for Investments in Latin America, 1 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 6
(1978). Brazil, however, is very selective regarding the foreign investments it encourages. Id.
Brazil seeks investors that will contribute to its long term economic development. PRICE
WATERHOUSE, BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 9. The current government strongly favors technologi-
cal development. Id.
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I. THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
The confluence of traditional legal doctrines, politics, and eco-
nomics shaped Latin America's attitude toward foreign investment
especially in Mexico, Peru, and Brazil. Two traditional legal doc-
trines relevant to mining investment relate to subsoil rights and
conflict of laws. Subsoil rights are deemed to belong to the nation.8
This concept evolved from the tradition in Spanish law that all
rights to elements of the subsurface inhered in the king.' Such a
legal attitude has practical significance for a foreign investor. Spe-
cifically it precludes an investor from purchasing real property
speculatively in the hope of obtaining a mineral laden tract.
Questions regarding the applicability of relevant law are settled
usually in Latin American countries by the Calvo doctrine.'0 The
Calvo doctrine contains two essential principles:
1. [S]overeign States, begin [sic] free and independent, enjoy
the right, on the basis of equality, to freedom from interference
by other States, either through force or diplomacy; and
2. although aliens should be accorded equal treatment with na-
tionals, they are not entitled to rights and privileges not accorded
nations and therefore must seek redress for grievances exclusively
in local courts."
In short, the first principle ensures nonintervention 2 of foreign na-
tions in Latin American business; the second principle ensures that
foreign investors are beholden to the host country's laws, without
recourse to their own governments when involved in a dispute with
a Latin American government." In essence, the Calvo doctrine em-
' PRICE WATERHOUSE, BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 1. For a review of Brazilian, Mexican, and
Peruvian laws exemplifying this view, see infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
' Sloan, supra note 7, at 1. The rights now inhere to the nation as a natural outgrowth of
the nationalistic movements that spawned the independence of Latin American nations
from Spain. See id. at 3-4.
"0 See id. at 1-2. The doctrine developed from the writings of Carlos Calvo, an Argentine
diplomat and legal scholar. A. GOLDBERT & Y. NUN, LATIN AMERICAN LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS
321 (1982). The doctrine gained acceptance because Latin America feared "unrestricted dip-
lomatic intervention in their internal affairs." Id. (quoting in part Gess, Permanent Sover-
eignty Over Natural Resources, 13 I.C.L.Q. 398, 414 (1964)). k
" A. GOLDBERT & Y. NUN, supra note 10, at 321 (quoting F. DAWSON & I. HEAD, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, NATIONAL TRIBUNALS, AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS 15 (1974)).
12 Id.
"s Sloan, supra note 7, at 1. The rationale behind this equal treatment provision was
stated succinctly: "[A] foreigner who voluntarily moves to a country which is not his own,
in search of a personal benefit, accepts in advance, together with the advantages which he is
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bodies the ambivalence that traditionally pervaded the Latin
American attitude toward United States investment.14 That am-
bivalence resulted from Latin America's fragmented political cul-
ture. Historically, Latin American countries were underdeveloped
and in need of capital, yet frequently United States investors,
which were tied to the government, exploited Latin America. 5 As a
result, some Latin Americans viewed the United States govern-
ment and hence, United States corporations," as "imperialists. 1 7
Thus, two attitudes now predominate Latin American thinking
concerning United States investment. On one hand, some groups
favor United States investment, viewing it as a safer mechanism to
secure capital than taxation." On the other hand, many Latin
American political leaders perceive economic nationalism and the
resulting conflict with foreign firms as "the cheapest and quickest
means to buy legitimacy ... .9
This ideological backdrop in conjunction with each nation's his-
torical attitude and current political view must be considered
strongly by United States companies in their investment decisions.
Of the three nations that this article considers, Brazil exhibits the
most stable historical and political climate for investment. Brazil's
political history reveals a preference for compromise rather than
violence "manifesting itself through significant constitutional sta-
bility and legality throughout its history."20 Major political
changes21 evolved gradually, rather than through bursts of chaotic
going to enjoy, the risk to which he may find himself exposed." W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 854 (3d ed. 1971) (quoting a Letter from Mexican Ambas-
sador Hay to United States Ambassador (Aug. 3, 1938)). While this doctrine is well estab-
lished in Latin American law, at least one scholar believes that it may be sidestepped
contractually by inserting into contracts a provision stipulating that potential disputes may
be settled through international arbitration. G. Aksen, Address at Vanderbilt University
Law School, Symposium of International Civil Litigation, conducted by VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. (Mar. 13, 1983).
" See generally Sloan, supra note 7, at 6.
'6 One such investor was the United Fruit Company. Id. at 8.
Latin Americans frequently do not distinguish between the United States government
and United States corporations. Id. The Marxist perspective, which is strong in many Latin
American countries, strongly affected Latin American foreign investment ideology. Accord-
ing to the Marxist view, the "government is merely an executive committee for United
States corporations." Id. Interestingly, European countries are not viewed in the same light.
See id.
17 Id.
'8 Id. at 3.
19 Id.
20 T. WEIL, supra note 1, at 3.
' For example, the attainment of independence in 1872 and the transformation from a
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violence,22 and after a brief period of unrest in the late 1960's and
early 1970's,23 a stable investment environment developed.24 The
attitude of the current Brazilian government toward United States
investment may be characterized as "open, frank, and direct."25
While investment opportunities in Brazil are encouraging, Brazil-
ian labor has not expressed outwardly a clear position concerning
foreign investment and management.2 6 "It would appear, [how-
ever], that the most acceptable method is foreign investment cou-
pled with national management. '27 Brazilian controlled joint ven-
tures clearly curry favor with the present political regime.2
Mexico is also an attractive nation in which to invest, although
perhaps not to the same extent as Brazil. While Mexico basically
has been stable, escaping major political violence for the last forty
years,29 its economy was and continues to be a source of concern.
monarchy to a republic in 1889 were the result of political growth and evolution. Id. at 4.
22 Id. at 3.
23 During the 1950's the intergovernmental balance of power was factionalized. As indus-
trialization increased, power began to shift from "traditional agrarian interests to the urban-
industrial and professional upper and middle classes." Id. at 4. Reacting to this swing, a
radical leftist wing developed seeking support for reform of social and political institutions.
Id. An inflation-smitten economy buttressed this movement, which generated strikes and
riots. Id. at 75. In 1961, then President Quadras resigned, leaving the country amidst politi-
cal pressure. Id. at 74. After those years of unrest, a revolution spearheaded by the armed
forces occurred in 1964. Id. at 75. The revolution succeeded to some extent in meeting its
goals. Under the military government tax collection was reformed, bank credit was tight-
ened, agricultural programs were reformed, and conditions were improved to facilitate for-
eign investment. Id.
In fact, in 1972 Brazil reported the largest growth in its economy. Id. Political conditions
have also improved steadily. For example, the harassment and kidnapping of foreign diplo-
mats that occurred during the revolutionary years was squelched. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, supra note 1, at 262. Now, the purportedly harsh measures used to accomplish that
end are being stopped by current President Geisel. Id. Moreover, the Roman Catholic
Church works with the current government to attain the social reform sought by the revo-
lutionaries. Such church involvement is natural since 80% of Brazil is Catholic. Cf. T. WEIL,
supra note 1, at 3. As a result of the aforementioned conditions, Brazil is increasingly stable,
and United States - Brazilian relationships are "friendly and close." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, supra note 1, at 265.
24 See generally T. FELSBERG, FOREIGN BUSINESS IN BRAZIL: A PRACTICAL LAW GUIDE (2d
ed. 1976).
2 Id. at 5.
" See PRICE WATERHOUSE, BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 9.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 J. RYAN, D. ALLISON, JR., T. SQUIRE, G. SUTTLE, K. WARREN, H. BRADLEY, R. JOHNSON, G.
CROTEAU, & C. COUNCIL, AREA HANDBOOK FOR MEXICO 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as J. RYAN].
Mexico is described as the most politically stable Latin American country. Id. Indeed, Mex-
ico is in little danger of a military takeover; its military budget is one of the smallest in the
world. Id. Under current, President Portillo, a former attorney and university professor,
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The government is unwilling to take steps to slow inflation, which
it fears would simultaneously slow the economy and raise the level
of unemployment."° Spiraling inflation increases the risk of losing
investment capital significantly. Insurance against such loss, how-
ever, is available to some extent from United States governmental
agencies. Historically, Mexico exhibited certain disdain for United
States investment operations. The expropriation of foreign opera-
tions in Mexico is well documented,3 1 and the continuance of a na-
tionalistic attitude concerning control of industry remanifested it-
self through recent legislation. 2  This legislation mandated
majority Mexican ownership in all new investments except those
not catagorized as being in the national interest.33 Apart from the
historical fears,3" which for some time inhibited United States in-
vestment, the current political attitude toward United States in-
vestment may be characterized as one of acceptance but not of en-
couragement. Indeed, Mexico has sought "to diversify away from
economic interdependence with the United States. . . ., Its
proximity to the United States, however, precludes that option.31
The Mexican government recognizes that substantial private capi-
tal investments are needed to stimulate employment and industrial
Mexico continues to achieve "a measure of representative democracy under an oligarchy."
Id. Opposition parties to the current government are small and ineffective. U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, supra note 1, at 706.
:0 PRICE WATERHOUSE, MEXICO, supra note 1, at 16.
' See generally W. GORDON, THE EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY IN MEX-
iCO (1976). The representation and nationalization of the railroads in 1937 and the petro-
leum legislation were the culmination of the 1917 revolution. The impetus behind the na-
tionalization was Lazaro Cardenas, a revolutionary fighter who assumed the presidency in
1934. To the masses, he symbolized the implementation of the most revolutionary clauses of
the Constitution of 1917, and his expropriation measures were a part of his "national social-
ism" program. J. RYAN, supra note 29, at 80-81. Those expropriations resulted in the loss of
millions of United States dollars.
32 Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment (Ley Para Promover la Inversion Mexi-
cana y Regular la Inversion Extranjera) 317 D.O.S., Mar. 9, 1973, reprinted and translated
in MEXICAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY LAWS (CCH) (1973). The
law was designed "to promote Mexican investment and to regulate foreign investment to
stimulate a just and balanced development and to consolidate the economic independence of
the country." Id. art. 1.
' See id. art. 4. Industries deemed to be in the national interest include: (1) petroleum,
(2) petrochemicals, (3) exploitation of radioactive minerals, (4) mining, (5) railroads, (6)
telephone and telegraph, and (7) other activities determined statutorily. Id.
See J. RYAN, supra note 29, at 410.
33 Murphy, Jr., The Echeverrian Wall: Two Perspectives on Foreign Investment and
Licensing in Mexico, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135, 146 (1982).
" Id.
256
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growth, 37 yet tax and other incentives are unavailable to companies
that are not controlled by Mexicans. 38 The attitude of organized
labor in Mexico does not wholly reflect the nationalistic posture.
Organized labor does not officially oppose United States invest-
ment. In fact, labor may even prefer to deal with companies pos-
sessing large amounts of foreign capital, believing that such com-
panies are more amenable to collective bargaining.39
From a historical perspective, investment opportunities in Peru
present a riddle, if not a gamble. For that reason, a decision to
invest in Peru must be calculated. Throughout this century, Peru-
vian governments vacillated between constitutional civilian and ex-
tra-constitutional military regimes.40 Despite this uncertainty, a
long history of United States investment in Peru exists, especially
in the mining sector.4 In fact, by the 1960's to 1970's foreign en-
terprises dominated Peru's overall economy.42 This disproportion-
ate economic balance, in conjunction with a changing Latin Ameri-
can attitude regarding foreign investment, led to political unrest
and a rash of expropriations. With the subsiding of internal unrest,
a more liberalized political attitude regarding foreign investment
17 See PRICE WATERHOUSE, MEXICO, supra note 1, at 17.
', Id. at 16.
" Id. at 18.
40 Comment, Regulation of American Business Interests in Peru - Basic Information for
American Attorneys, 15 CATH. U.L. REV. 93, 95 (1966).
41 A. GOLDBERT & Y. NUN, supra note 10, at 347.
42 Id. The expropriations resulted from revolutionary zeal reacting to a socio-economic
system that was smitten by rigidity and stratification. R. Nyrop, supra note 1, at xx. In 1968
a military junta led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado seized power intending to revolution-
ize society. He instituted a five year plan of development stressing reorientation of capital
from agriculture to industry, expropriation of large estates, and land distribution to the
peasants. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 1, at 822. During the early 1970's, the
Velasco government nationalized staggering numbers of industrial and commercial firms,
and by 1975 those enterprises accounted for the nation's complete production of fertilizer,
fishmeal, petroleum, and steel. R. Nyrop, supra note 1, at xx. Moreover, nationalized firms
dominated the mining and metal refining industries. Id. President Velasco fell into disfavor
when many of his reform plans did not comport with rising expectations. U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, supra note 1, at 822-23. He was replaced by General Francisco Bermudez in 1975,
at which time the military chiefs "engineered" Velasco's retirement. R. Nyrop, supra note 1,
at xxii. Bermudez instituted an austerity program to cope with other reform programs that
usurped Peru's monetary resources. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 1, at 823. During
this "austerity program" severe national discontent arose leading to widespread demonstra-
tions and a declaration of emergency. Id. The state of emergency was lifted in 1977 and the
government became devoted to more pragmatic programs. Id. In 1980, Fernando Belaunde
Terry was inaugurated as president while the armed forces relinquished control. Ironically,
Belaunde was president when the military seized power in 1968. R. Nyrop, supra note 1, at
xix.
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developed. The current government "welcomes and needs foreign
investment and technology" and in fact actively attempts to at-
tract foreign investment.4 3 From the United States perspective, the
opportunity to invest in Peru is now more appealing than it has
been in over a decade. "No major outstanding expropriations exist
to impede normal economic relations between the United States
and Peru. ' 44 Moreover, Peru recently liberalized its law concerning
remittance of foreign profits.45 Twenty percent of the foreign capi-
tal may now be remitted abroad annually. 6 Finally, the attitude of
the Peruvian labor force is favorable to foreign investment, per-
ceiving it as a way to remedy underdevelopment. 7
A review of Mexico, Peru, and Brazil concerning the availability
of resources, the need for development, and the history of foreign
investment in those nations reveals, on one hand, a potential "gold
mine" for pragmatic investors and, on the other hand, a potential
"Pandora's Box" for the unwary. It is an understatement to posit
that the mineral resources of each country are vast. The mere
availability of resources, however, should not determine any invest-
ment decision. Indeed, the current law regarding foreign invest-
ment in these nations cannot be read in a vacuum.48 The history of
foreign investment, the current political climate, and the stability
of governmental leadership must also enter into any investment
decision. For these reasons, investment in the mining industry of
Mexico, Brazil, and Peru is an attractive, yet enigmatic,
"' See PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1, at 11.
14 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 1, at 82. See generally U.S. and Peru Reach
Agreement on Marcona Mining Co. Issue, 75 DEPT. ST. BULL. 487, 488 (1975).
45 PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1, at 11. This measure comports with the current
policy of the Andean Common Market (ANCOM). Id. ANCOM is comprised of Columbia,
Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Ryerson, Legal Problems of Investment in the
Andean Market, 1 Hous.- J. INT'L L. 29 (1978). ANCOM's policy is grounded in the belief
that "central planning is a precondition of balanced trade and equitable growth." Id. In
accord with that goal, ANCOM established "minimum restrictive standards" regarding for-
eign investment. Id. at 30. For a review of those restrictions, see id. at 30-33.
Ryerson, supra note 45, at 31; PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1, at 11.
PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1, at 11.
's This is an understatement. When investing in Latin America even the simplest princi-
ple of contract law may be ignored. As one scholar stated:
the major difficulty between the United States and Latin America is the fact that
Latin American governments sometimes feel free and sometimes compelled, to
constantly shift the terms of agreement with United States corporations. A long-
term agreement with one government may not be removed by a succeeding
one .... The terms of the agreement in the Latin American environment cannot
be set for a long time.
Sloan, supra note 7, at 2.
[Vol. 14:251
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proposition.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL MINING LEGISLATION4 9 OF
BRAZIL, MEXICO AND PERU
A. General Provisions
One clue in solving the investment riddle lies obviously in the
codified mining laws of each country. The mining industries of
Brazil, Mexico, and Peru are governed by specific mining codes50
which must be read in conjunction with their tax and business or-
ganization statutes. In each nation the regulation of mining rests
primarily with governmental or administrative agencies. In Brazil,
the federal government administers mineral resources, mineral
production, and the distribution, trade, and consumption of min-
eral products.5 1 Mining activities are directed by the Ministry of
Mines and Energy,52 which coordinates the policy of the mining
sector, studies and proposes measures to stimulate development of
the mining industry, and plans and coordinates the execution of
geological studies. 3
4 References to legislation of these countries were discovered primarily through the use
of secondary resource materials. Reference to the primary authority will be made in con-
junction with the secondary source where necessary. While in most instances this method is
not the optimal way to research, in this instance it was the only feasible method. Moreover,
it is apparently not an uncommon method. As an attorney dealing frequently in Latin
American investment wrote:
To gain a thorough understanding of the local law, a United States investor
should request his lawyer to research the foreign law in such secondary source
materials as are available to the lawyer, then the lawyer should have his conclu-
sions confirmed or corrected by local counsel in the country where the investment
is to be effected.
Ryerson, supra note 45, at 29.
50 Mining Code of Jan. 29, 1940, reenacted by Decree-Law 2277 (Feb. 28, 1967), regulated
by Decree 62,934 (July 2, 1968), discussed in ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, GENERAL
SECRETARIAT, MINING AND PETROLEUM REGULATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 5
(Brazil)(1979) [hereinafter cited as OAS-Brazil]; Law on Taxation and Promotion of Mining
(Dec. 30, 1955), discussed in ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, GENERAL SECRETARIAT,
MINING AND PETROLEUM REGULATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 5 (Mexico)
[hereinafter cited as OAS-Mexico]; Law Regulating Article 27 of the Constitution (Dec. 11,
1975), discussed in ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, GENERAL SECRETARIAT, MINING AND
PETROLEUM REGULATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 6 (Mexico) [hereinafter
cited as Mining Law of 1975]; General Mining Law, Decree No. 18,800, El Peruano (June 9,
1971), modified in part by Decree-Law No. 22,197 (May 30, 1978)(Peru), discussed in OR-
GANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, GENERAL SECRETARIAT, MINING AND PETROLEUM REGULA-
TIONS OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 16 (Peru) [hereinafter cited as OAS-Peru].
OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 5.
5' See Decree-Law 3,782 (June 22, 1960), discussed in OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 5.
Id. Specifically, the Ministry is divided into three discreet organs each with designated
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Mexico's mining sector is controlled similarly. The Secretariat of
National Properties has broad powers to regulate the mining in-
dustry.54 The Secretariat advises the federal executive on all as-
pects of the mining sector and promotes the organization of mining
enterprises with state participation.55 Moreover, the Secretariat is
empowered to intervene in the "direction, management and finan-
cial and administrative supervision of public mining entities and
[other] mining enterprises with state participation. '56 A second
federal administrative entity, the Mining Development Commis-
sion (Comision de Fomento Minero), was established generally to
foster the development of the Mexican mining industry. 57 Its pow-
ers and obligations are of broad range by necessity.5 8 The Commis-
functions. Decree 75,468 (Mar. 11, 1975)(Brazil)(Diario Oficial of Mar. 14, 1975), discussed
in OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 5. The organizations and their functions are:
The Superior Mining Council (Conselho Superior de Minas):
1) Coordinates policy of the mining sector under supervision of the minister of
state;
The Executive Group of the Mining Industry (Grupo Executive da Induistria
Mineracao):
1) Studies and proposes changes in the mining industry,
2) analyzes projects of the industry,
3) considers requests for the granting of incentives;
The National Department of Mineral Production (Departamento Nacional da
Producao Mineral):
1) Plans and executes geological studies on the national territory,
2) supervises the fiscal control of the mining industry.
Id.
:4 See Mining Law of 1975, art. 24, discussed in Mining Law of 1975, supra note 50, at 14.
I' d.
Id. The Secretariat has other ancillary powers including:
1) determining the federal mining policy and promoting the industrialization of
the mining sector;
2) rendering official opinions concerning the mining sector;
3) advising the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit regarding mineral taxation;
4) establishing production quotas;
.5) issuing tariffs;
6) conducting inspection visits to mining sites;
7) observing topography to obtain data on mineral deposits in a general area;
8) verifying compliance with legal obligations.
Id. at 14-15.
" Id. art. 90, at 15.
" The Commission is responsible for the following operations:
1) The exploitation of mines, either directly or through contracts with persons or
entities;
2) The purchasing. . .selling. . .and merchandising of all minerals. ..
3) The establishment of loan systems for miners;
4) The leasing and selling of mining implements. ..
5) The granting of refactionary loans to miners;
6) The granting of advances in connection with mining promotion agreements or
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sion also acts as a "service agency to private industry and individu-
als engaged in mining. . . .. Other federal administrative
agencies include the Council on Nonrenewable Natural Re-
sources,60 the Board of Mineral Resources,"1 the Nacional Finan-
62 thciera, and the Nonmetallic Minerals Trust. 3
The Peruvian mining sector is also regulated intensively by the
state, though in a manner significantly different from that of Mex-
ico and Brazil. In Peru, the General Mining Law" confers "special
on the value of minerals;
7) The acquisition, installation and operation of plants for concentration, treat-
ment, smelting and refining of metals and minerals, as well as their processing or
industrialization;
8) Technical and administrative assistance to miners or companies requesting it;
9) The management of mining and metallurgical companies, or businesses, as well
as enterprises which market or process mining products;
10) Promoting the establishment of mining companies and enterprises related to
mining, as well as mining and metallurgical marketing or processing companies;
11) The acquisition under any title and the subscription and sale of shares repre-
senting the capital stock of mining or related companies, as well as enterprises
which market or process mining metallurgical products;
12) The negotiation and acquistion of credits and loans in general; the issuance,
acceptance, endorsement and negotiation of credit instruments, the granting of
guaranteeing of obligations acquired by third parties;
13) Supervising. . .the assistance granted to miners according to the law...
14) Acting as trustee in mining and metallurgical enterprises.
Id. art. 90, at 16-17.
9 For this reason, investors should be aware that the Commissioner has branch offices in
Satillo, Torreon, Chihuahua, Hermosillo, Durango, Guadalajara, Zacotecas, Urapan, and
Coatzacoal. OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 17.
So This agency was organized pursuant to Organic Law of Dec. 30, 1957 (Mexico), dis-
cussed in OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 17-18. The Council is a consultative body for the
"federal executive in matters pertaining to all questions of a technical or legal nature affect-
ing the national mining policy which includes planning activity designed to promote compa-
nies utilizing non-renewable natural resources." Id.
" The Board was organized pursuant to Mining Law of 1975, art. 95 (Mexico) discussed
in OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 18-19. Its primary duties include: (1) advising the Minis-
try of National Properties as to which areas should be included in National Mining re-
sources; (2) providing advice regarding majority state participation companies and on spe-
cial concessions; (3) acting as a consultative body regarding problems related to mineral
resources; and (4) preparing studies on the mining industry. Id.
62 The Nacional Financiera is not tied to the mining sector but has made loans to mining
industries. OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 19.
63 The Trust (Minerales no Metalicos Mexicanos) was established by Acuerdo of Oct. 30,
1974 (Diario Oficial of Nov. 1, 1984), discussed in OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 19. The
Trust was designed to "improve, expand, and develop the exploration, exploitation, financ-
ing and marketing of nonmetallic metals." Id. at 19-20. From the investor's point of view,
this agency's utility lies in its responsibility for providing technical assistance to concession-
holders. See id. at 20.
64 General Mining Law, Decree No. 18,880, El Peruano (June 9, 1971), modified in part
by Decree-Law No. 22,197 (May 30, 1978), discussed in OAS-Peru, supra note 50, at 16. The
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rights" on the state to control mining. Pursuant to the General
Mining Law, the state"5 may deem certain territories to be exempt
from non-state claims or concessions for a period of up to five
years to facilitate national development and exploration of that
territory.6 Marketing and refining of minerals are also exclusively
within the state's domain. 7 The Peruvian Mining Company (Em-
presa Minero del Peru) is the primary entity through which the
state regulates, monopolizes, and otherwise dominates the mining
industry.6 8 Its responsibilities are broad 9 and include managing
the state's role in the mining sector, representing the state in the
formation and management of associate state mining companies,
marketing mineral products , 7 carrying out mining advancing pro-
grams, and furthering scientific research and development. 1
Minero del Peru is an entity with which the foreign investor must
be intimately familiar; it is authorized to lend exploration services
in areas conceded to third parties7 2 and "[to] form companies for
mining activities in concessions granted to individuals. '73 The Cen-
tral Peruvian Mining Company (Centromin-Peru) is an autono-
mous state-owned "arm" of Minero del Peru to which a great deal
General Mining Law governs all activities "related to the use of mineral and fossil matter
contained in the soil and subsoil of the National territory, including the sea, continental
shelfland and sea bottom." OAS-Peru, supra note 50, at 5-6. It does not govern petroleum
extraction. Id. at 6.
" Specifically, the executive branch has this duty. Id. at 18-19.
" General Mining Law, Decree No. 18,880, discussed in OAS-Peru, supra note 50, at 16.
7 OAS-Peru, supra note 50, at 19. Supreme Decree 44-76-EM/DGM (Sept. 29, 1976)
(Peru) governs the conditions-for marketing mining products. The Ministry of Commerce
markets all mining products. Decree-Law 20,488 (Dec. 18, 1973), discussed in OAS-Peru,
supra note 50, at 19.
" The Peruvian Mining Company was created by Decree-Law 18,225 (1970) and is gov-
erned currently by Decree-Law 20,035, El Peruano (May 30, 1973). Minero Peru is a decen-
tralized public agency. It has a juridical personality in international law. OAS-Peru, supra
note 50, at 17. Organizationally, it is governed by a board of directors and divided into the
following six branches: (1) government, (2) control, (3) executive, (4) advisory, (5) opera-
tive, and (6) support organs. Id. Moreover, Minero Peru is the state's mining monopoly. R.
Nyrop, supra note 1, at 46.
69 See Decree-Law 20,035, El Peruano (May 30, 1973), discussed in OAS-Peru, supra
note 50, at 19-20.
70 Id. at 19. Decree-Law 20,488, art. 34 incorporated the marketing sector of Minero Peru
into the Ministry of Commerce. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
11 Minero Peru also is beholden for the professional and technical development of its
workers. Decree-Law 20,035, discussed in OAS-Peru, supra note 50, at 20. Moreover, it may
contract for studies, consultations, or supervision subject to certain conditions, and it may
freely enter into other contracts enabling it to meet its goals. See id. art. 23.
7' Executive approval is required. Id.
71 Id. For an outline of Minero Peru's responsibilities and powers, see OAS-Peru, supra
note 50, at 19-22.
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of the state's managerial responsibilities are delegated. 4 The state
also participates directly in private aspects of the mining industry
via associated state mining enterprises and special mining enter-
prises. The associated state mining enterprises (Empresas Es-
tatales Mineros, A Sociadas) are entities in which the state jointly
holds at least twenty-five percent of the capital together with Pe-
ruvian nationals.75 Special mining enterprises are entities in which
the state participates with a twenty-five percent minimum capital
investment with foreign, or national and foreign, persons.76 These
enterprises are not part of the private sector.77
In conclusion, a review of the regulatory methods utilized by
Mexico, Brazil, and Peru to control their.mining industries reveals
much common ground. First, state control is extensive if not ubiq-
uitous. Second, the technological and economical development of
the mining sector is also entrusted to the state. To the investor
this means that any rulings or releases by national regulatory agen-
cies offer invaluable predictions and insights as to whether a spe-
cific mining venture may enter the market and succeed. For this
reason, the investor should familiarize himself thoroughly with
each country's regulatory bodies, their composition, and their atti-
tudes before making an investment decision.78
B. Ownership of the Minerals
Mineral ownership in Mexico, Peru, and Brazil is accorded to
the state. 79 This right of ownership is imbedded in the Mexican
" See Decree-Law 21,117, El Peruano (Mar. 19, 1975), discussed in OAS-Peru, supra
note 50, at 22.
75 See OAS-Peru, supra note 50, at 23.
76 Id.
77 Id.
7' This analysis is an essential aspect of the investment decision as there is virtually no
case law in these nations regarding decisions concerning the procurement of concessions and
their continued utilization. Moreover, obtainment of concessions frequently is discretionary.
Discussion with Professor Igor Kavass, at Vanderbilt University Law School, Nashville, TN
(Mar. 22, 1983).
" See supra note 8 and accompanying text. This differs radically from the United States,
where at common law the surface owner was deemed to own the subsurface as well. See, e.g.,
Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S.E. 308 (1927). Moreover, even lands
reserved by the United States federal government as "valuable for minerals", see 30 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1976), may be acquired by private individuals. See United States v. Coleman, 39 U.S.
599, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968). A possible explanation for this difference in attitude
between the United States and its South American neighbors is that conferring mineral
ownership upon the king impedes the free alienability of land. "Free alienability" is a public
policy goal that is recognized consistently by the United States courts.
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constitution8" and reiterated in its Civil Code.81 Similarly in Peru,
the General Mining Law stipulates that minerals are the "inaliena-
ble and imprescriptible property of the state regardless of the na-
ture of the substances that they contain. '82 Finally, Brazil also has
adopted this nationalistic doctrine. Its revised Mineral Code"' clas-
sifies subsoil rights as within the public domain.84 This enactment
in Brazil is significant because it abolished the preferential right of
a surface owner to exploit mineral resources under his property.15
Article 84 of the Brazilian Mining Code deems "mineral deposits
to be real property distinct from the ground in which it is located,"
and provides further that surface ownership does not include own-
ership of underlying mineral deposits.8 6 From the investor's per-
spective, the concept of national ownership is significant. First, it
deprives investors of the opportunity to make acquisitions of raw
land for speculative purposes. Second, Brazil's enactment of its
new Mineral Code, which deprives the surface owner of his prefer-
ential right to mine, is indicative of the prevailing trend in Latin
American countries toward protecting fervently any economical
"edge" they may possess in an attempt to foster development.
C. Obtaining a Mining Concession
As minerals are owned by the state in Mexico, Brazil, and Peru,
they may be exploited only upon the granting of a concession by
80 Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanase art. 27, para. 4 (Mex.), dis-
cussed in OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 5-6. Paragraph four provides:
It corresponds to the Nationa, the direct domain of all natural resources of the
continental platform and submarine shelves of the islands; of all minerals or sub-
stances which in veins, layers, masses or deposits constitute deposits whose nature
is different from the components of the lands, such as the minerals from which
metals and metaloids used in industry are extracted; the deposits of precious
stones, rock salt and the salines formed directed by marine waters; the products
derived from the decomposition of the rocks, when their exploitation requires un-
derground works; the mineral or organic deposits of materials capable of being
utilized as fertilizers; combustible solid minerals; petroleum and all solid, liquid or
gaseous hydrocarbons; and, of the space located over the national territory in the
extension and terms fixed by international law.
Id.
81 The Mexican Civil Code provides: "The owner of land is not the owner of the mineral
or substances mentioned in the fourth paragraph of Article 27 of the Political Constitution
of the United Mexican States .. " Mexican Civil Code, tit. 4, art. 838.
82 General Mining Law, Decree No. 18,880, discussed in OAS-Peru, supra note 50, at 5.
8' Decree-Law 227 (Feb. 28, 1967), discussed in OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 5.
84 T. Weil, supra note 1, at 286.
8' OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 5.
88 Decree-Law 227 (Feb. 28, 1967). Id. at 6.
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decree of the federal government.
1. Mining Concessions in Brazil87
Brazil defines exploitations (lavra) of minerals as "coordinated
operations to obtain an industrial utilization of a [mineral] de-
posit."88 To obtain a concession, two threshold requirements must
be met. First, the concession must qualify as a "mining enterprise"
8 Before a concession or exploitation begins, it is necessary to obtain an exploration li-
cense (pesauisa). Exploration is the work required to identify a deposit, estimate its value,
and determine the economic feasibility of exploitation. Decree-Law 227, art. 14 (Feb. 28,
1967) (Brazil), discussed in OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 10. An application for exploration
is granted solely to a "Brazilian natural or juridical person or [a] mining enterprise." Id.
Two copies of the application must be submitted to the Ministry of Mines and Energy and
contain the following information:
1) identification of the applicant including name, nationality, domicile, and if a
juridical person, a copy of the authorization to act as mining enterprise;
2) an indication of the substances to be explored, a description of the area to be
mined, and the names of adjacent surface land holders;
3) a scale map of the geographical features of the area to be mined; and
4) a working plan including source and availability of capital.
Id. art. 16, amended by Law 6,403 (Dec. 15, 1976) (Brazil).
Once approved the applicant has 30 days in which to pay the required fee. Applicants are
approved subject to the following conditions:
1. The title is personal and is transmissible only in case of necessary heirs or sur-
viving spouse, or in commercial succession if the successor meets certain of the
Code requirements;
2. The authorization is valid for two years, renewable for one additional year if
justification for continuance is shown and a new fee is paid;
3. Prospecting may not be conducted outside the authorized area;
4. Prospecting in river beds, navigable rivers, lakes, and the continental shelf is
authorized only if this will not prejudice navigation and is in observance of regula-
tions of competent authorities;
5. Prospecting in areas near fortifications, railways, water supplies, public thor-
oughfares, and parks is subject to permission by pertinent authorities;
6. The rights of third parties must be respected and the title holder is responsible
for damages without liability of the government for restrictions due to such rights;
7. Mineral substances extracted during prospecting may .be removed from the ar-
eas only for analyses and tests but sale of commercial quantities may be author-
ized under specific conditions;
8. When work is concluded a detailed report must be submitted on the mineral
reserve of the deposit, quality of the ore or mineral substance, and feasibility of
exploitation in accordance with specified standards. This report is required re-
gardless of the results of exploration.
Id.
Once the exploration license is granted, its holder must begin to prospect within 10 days.
A final report of exploration must be submitted to the Ministry of Mines and Energy upon
completion of exploration. If that report is approved, the license holder has one year to
apply for a concession. OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 12.
88 Decree-Law 227, art. 30, discussed in OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 13.
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(empresa de mineracao).89 A "mining enterprise" is "any firm or
company organized and domiciled in Brazil, regardless of its legal
form, which has among its objectives the utilization of mineral de-
posits within the country."90 Thus, in Brazil the foreign investor
may not mine through a branch of a United States business entity.
The mining enterprise may be composed of nationals or foreigners,
and natural persons or legal entities.9 1 Second, before federal au-
thorization is granted, the deposit must be appropriately pros-
pected and approved by the Department of Mineral Production.2
The Department of Mineral Production forwards the concession
request to the Ministry of Mines and Energy for final approval.
The request must contain the following information:93 (1) a cer-
tificate of registration94 in the register of commerce, (2) a descrip-
tion of the mineral deposits to be exploited, (3) a description of the
mining field's location and indications of neighboring exploration
areas,9 5 (4) a graphic definition of the area to be mined,96 (5) refer-
ence to any required easements, 97 (6) a working plan for the ex-
ploitation including a description of processing installations, and
(7) proof of sufficient capital to work the mine.
Procedurally, many loops must be passed through before a con-
cession is granted in Brazil. First, a working plan must be submit-
89 Id.
90 Id. at 19.
9, Id. The Brazilian Supreme Court held that a Brazilian corporation with foreign share-
holders may obtain exploration and exploitation concessions. Id. at 20.
9' Id. at 13.
" Id. at 13-14.
94 The National Department of Mineral Production keeps four registers of documents
relevant to the mining industry. They are divided as "Books" A through D. Book A contains
a list of all known deposits and mines; Book B is a register of exploration licenses; Book C is
a list of exploitation concessions; and Book D is a register of mining enterprises. Id. at 21.
Prospecting licenses and concession decrees are published in the federal Diario Oficial, at
the applicants' expense. Id. Notice may be listed similarly in private newspapers. When this
is done, a copy of the notice must be forwarded to the Department of Mineral Production.
Id.
91 This description must delineate the location with respect to valleys, streams, railways,
and other topographical features. Id. at 13.
" This description must indicate boundaries geometrically and show affected properties
and the names of their surface holders. Id. at 14.
9 Requisite easements needed for exploitation may be established on either the surface
or in the subsurface. Moreover, the easements may extend beyond the property sought to be
exploited. Id. at 17. Examples of appropriate easements include transportation roads and
water lines. Id. Where adjoining land is subject to an easement its landowner must be com-
pensated by the mining entity before exploitation begins. Id. Where disagreement over ade-
quate compensation occurs, the amount is determined by the state through appraisal and
arbitration. Id.
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ted in duplicate, detailing the mining methods and scale of pro-
duction. Additionally, the request for a concession must be
accompanied by several documents relating to the business en-
tity.98 When authorization to exploit is received from the Depart-
ment of Mineral Production, it must be recorded in the register of
commerce as must any changes in the contract or bylaws of the
mining entity.9 Subsequent to authorization, title to the conces-
sion is transferred from the government by a decree signed by the
president,100 which must be recorded with the Department of Min-
eral Production.01 ' An application may be rejected when the con-
cession is deemed to be "prejudicial to the public good" or would
"compromise interests considered greater than the exploitation.' ' 02
a. Rights and Obligations of the Concessionaire in Brazil
The Mining Code imposes sixteen basic obligations upon the
concessionaire. 103 These obligations may be catagorized broadly as
procedural, 04 waste preventive,'0 5 and reporting.'0 6 The rights af-
98 These documents are:
(1) In the case of an individual firm, an authenticated photostat copy of the entry
in the register of commerce maintained by the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce;
(2) In the case of a partnership, a photostat or duplicate copy of the company
contract and proof of its registration in the register of commerce;
(3) In the case of a corporation, the page from the Diario Oficial in which its
instrument of organization is published.
Id. at 20. Where a foreign legal entity is involved, proof must be submitted of its legal
personality including translations of its instrument of organization, by-laws and a statement
providing that it is legally organized according to the laws of the foreign nation. Id.
91 Id. at 20.
1"0 More specifically, title (posse de jazida) is actually conferred within 90 days following
the decree's publication in the Diario Oficial. Id. at 14; see supra note 95. The boundaries of
the tract must be marked before title is conferred. See OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 15.
OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 14.
102 Id. If rejected, however, the applicant may be entitled to compensation for exploration
expenses. Id.
10I Decree-Law 227, art. 47 (Feb. 28, 1967)(Brazil), discussed in OAS-Brazil, supra note
50, at 15-16.
104 Those obligations grouped by the author as "procedural" include:
(1) to begin work within six months after the concession decree was published in Diario
Oficial;
(2) to work the concession as per the approved plan;
(3) to extract only those minerals listed in the concession decree;
(4) to notify the Department of Mineral Production if any new minerals are discovered;
(5) to not violate any applicable mining regulations;
(6) to employ only technically qualified individuals; and
(7) "[tio adopt measures indicated by supervisory authorities." Id.
' Those obligations grouped as "waste preventive" are:
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forded to a concessionaire are reasonable though not extensive.
First, he may encumber the concession if the encumbrance is re-
corded. 10 7 Second, where various concessions within the same min-
ing zone are held by the concessionaire they may be united into a
single concession.108 Third, for just cause a suspension of opera-
tions may be requested; 10 9 and finally, if the concessionaire is in-
volved in legal proceedings, the property being mined may not be
attached or sequestered if it would result in an interruption of the
exploitation. 10
b. Termination of the Concession in Brazil
It is essential to comply with the pro forma obligations imposed
by the Brazilian Mining Code as their violation can result in a
warning or fine at a minimum, or even forfeiture of the conces-
sion. 1  Forfeitures are declared by the federal government 2 upon
verification of any of the following events: (1) abandonment of
the mine; (2) noncompliance with statutory time limits; (3) deliber-
ate exploitation of minerals contrary to agreement; (4) excessive
extraction of substances not covered by the concession; and (5)
noncompliance with supervisory obligations.
Many of the obligations are vague," and the specific language
permitting forfeiture is open-ended; thus, it is essential that the
concessionaire adhere strictly to all regulations and temporal re-
quirements imposed by the Brazilian government. Obviously, for-
(1) to prevent excessive workings from hindering future utilization of a deposit;
(2) to provide compensation for damages to third parties;
(3) to ensure safe conditions on the mining premises;
(4) to prevent water wastage and to provide adequate water drainage;
(5) to prevent air and water pollution; and
(6) to maintain the mine in the event that exploitation is suspended. Id.
104 Those obligations classified as "reporting" include:
(1) "To notify the Department of Mineral Production before suspending work" and
(2) to submit an annual report of the previous year's activities in accord with Law 6,403
(Dec. 15, 1976)(Brazil). Id. (Law 6,403 requires that a concession holder indicate: (a)
"method of operations, transportation, and marketing..."; (b) "changes noted in reserves,
characteristics of minerals produced, minimum economic possibilities"; (c) "monthly statis-
tics on production, stocks, prices, and taxes"; (d) number of employees; (e) investments
made in exploration and exploitations; and (f) the enterprise's annual balance sheet. Id.
107 Id. at 16.
108 Decree-Law 227, art. 53, discussed in OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 16.
109 OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 17.
110 Id.
"I Id. A fine or warning is meted out according to the infraction's seriousness. Id. at 18.
112 Id.
11 See supra notes 104-06'
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feiture is costly to the investor, and in most cases the foreign con-
cessionaire lacks legitimate recourse.11 4 Hence, because forfeitures
may be discretionary, it is politically essential for the concession-
aire to comply with all requests no matter how simple they may
appear. 115
2. Mining Concessions in Mexico
In Mexico concessions may be granted either for exploration "
or exploitation. 1 7 To obtain an exploration concession, an applica-
tion must be submitted to the appropriate mining agency and then
forwarded to the Secretariat of the National Properties. " The
Secretariat examines the application to ensure compliance with ap-
plicable regulations. " 9 If the requirements are satisfied, title is is-
sued to the applicant. If defects are discovered, the application is
returned either to the appropriate local mining agency or to the
applicant.20 Filing a request for a concession on "free lands 1 21
confers a "preferential right" upon the applicant over subsequent
applications, unless the subsequent applicant can demonstrate a
"4 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
"' While the author does not espouse bribery as a mode of conducting business, it is
prevalent in Latin America, Votaw, Problems in Financing Latin American Investment, 1
HARV. J. INT'L L. 21, 27 (1981), and may even violate United States law. See Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a note, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. 1981). "Busi-
ness is not done any other way [in Latin America]. It is the way it has been and the way it
will continue to be." Votaw, supra, at 27. Thus, the United States investor desiring to enter
the Latin American mining sector should not enter blindly.
"' This is comparable to the "license" for exploration available in Brazil. See supra note
87.
" Miranda, Exploring for Minerals in Mexico - An Overview of Legal Considerations,
27A ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 431, 443-44 (1981).
"8 OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 25.
11 Id.
120 Id.
I Free lands encompass all areas within Mexico except for the following:
a. The continental shelf, the seabed adjacent to the islands, keys and reefs of the
land-sea area, in the seabed, and in the seabed of the maritime zone;
b. The national mining reserves;
c. Areas covered by mining allotments in force;
d. Areas covered by mining concessions in force;
e. Areas covered by an application for a mining allotment or concession under
process;
f. Areas covered by an application for a mining allotment or concession rejected
until the corresponding publication of vacancy becomes effective;
g. Areas covered by a mining concession or declaration of allotment of national
mining reserves voided until the corresponding publication of vacancy becomes
effective.
Id. at 10-11.
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greater need to the Ministry of National Properties. 22 The appli-
cation, which is filed with the Ministry of National Properties,
must include a detailed work program.12 3 An exploration conces-
sion is valid for three years and may be renewed once if the conces-
sionaire has satisfied the obligations of title.124 Those obligations
include carrying out the approved work program and filing annu-
ally a report indicating the results of exploration. 12 5 The report
must be filed with the Board of Mineral Resources. 2 "
An application for an exploitation concession may be filed when
the exploration concessionaire has satisfied those obligations spe-
cific to the exploration concession. 127 This application must be filed
with the Ministry of National Properties. Included with the appli-
cation must be a work program covering four to six years. 28 Upon
approval, this program becomes a part of the concession title. 29 An
exploitation concession covers only those minerals discovered dur-
ing exploration' 30 and further, the exploitation concession permits
mining from a tract encompassing a maximum area of 500 hect-
ares.'3' Exploitation concessions in Mexico are valid for twenty-
five years and, under certain circumstances, may be extended for
an additional twenty-five years.1 32
122 Id. at 24.
"'3 Id. at 22.
124 Id. For a brief discussion of those obligations, see infra text accompanying notes 126-
27. The renewal, however, may cover an area not to exceed 5,000 hectares. OAS-Brazil,
supra note 50, at 22. Thus, while an original concession may cover an area of up to 50,000
hectares, that area must be reduced to 5,000 hectares by the end of the initial three year
grant. Id. One hectare equals 2.471 acres. See WEBSTER's NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1154 (2d ed.
1953).
12" Id.
326 Id.
227 Id. at 23.
328 Rocha, Operating a Mine in Mexico - An Overview of the Legal Considerations, 27A
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 553, 586 (1981).
129 Id.
'10 OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 22.
123 Rocha, supra note 128, at 587.
1322 Id.; see OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 23. To receive the extension, the concessionaire
must apply within the last 10 years of the initial concession and demonstrate that the valid-
ity of the concession requires additional work and investments beyond the period covered
by the concession. OAS-Mexico, supra note 51, at 23. Moreover, three specific requirements
must be satisfied to qualify for an extension. They are:
1. The applicant is a corporation with a minority government capital
participation.
2. The percentage of capital of the corporation which represents shares Series "A"
stock (or Mexican) is not less than 60% in the case of an ordinary conces-
sion. . .(Initial participation is 51% Mexican capital for regular
270 [Vol. 14:251
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a. Rights and Obligations of the Concessionaire in Mexico
In Mexico concessionaires are given broad rights and are sub-
jected to extensive obligations. The three primary obligations 133
concern paying a surface tax,3  meeting work requirements,' 35 and
providing proof of assessments of work.13 Other obligations exist
that cannot be minimized. Where a concessionaire fails to comply
with any obligation, he is given sixty days by the Ministry of Patri-
mony and Industrial Development to present defenses, the absence
of which results in nullifcation of the concession title.1
3 7
The broad rights accompanying a concession in Mexico may be
classified as either property related or accessory rights. The prop-
erty rights include the right to transfer,' the ability to lease,3 9
concession)... and
3. The concession has been exploited directly if the owner is of Mexican
nationality.
Rocha, supra note 128, at 587.
"' See Rocha, supra note 128, at 590.
134 Stated briefly, the surface tax is imposed annually upon the beneficiary of an explora-
tion or exploitation concession. Id. at 587. The rate for an exploration concession is 10 pesos
per hectare; for an exploitation concession the rate is 30 pesos per hectare. Id.
' The concession holder must carry out exploitation work, presenting proof thereof
every two years. Id. In addition, the value of the work must meet minimum requirements
based on the area of concession and the type of substances exploited. Id.
"' The proof of assessment of work is a report submitted to the General Bureau of Mines
indicating that work performed is within the terms and under the conditions specified in the
law. Id. at 587-88.
"37 Other obligations include the following:
1) answering "questionaires submitted by the Secretariat of National Properties and sub-
mit[ting] periodic reports" covering various areas including: economic and accounting
data, construction work, and proposed projects;
2) conducting exploitations in a non-wasteful manner within a reasonable profit margin;
3) maintaining installations and equipment in good order;
4) reporting newly discovered mineral deposits;
5) providing immediate notification of a temporary suspension operation and the reason
therefor;
6) designating an agent to receive notices;
7) adhering to applicable safety regulations;
8) maintaining a Mexican engineer in the plant who is responsible for ensuring compli-
ance with safety regulations;
9) providing government inspection personnel with the facilities necessary to inspect the
mining operation;
10) permitting students from mining schools to observe the mining activities;
11) providing monthly reports to the Ministry of National Properties concerning data on
production and disposition of minerals; and
12) reporting changes in the capital structure of the mining enterprise. OAS-Mexico,
supra note 50, at 27; Rocha, supra note 128, at 591-92.
's A concession may be transferred when authorized by the Ministry of National Proper-
ties to individuals meeting the requirements necessary to obtain a concession directly from
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and the capacity to withdraw from the concession. 140 The accessory
rights of a concessionaire are varied. Most prominent is the right
to expropriate or occupy private lands necessary for installation of
mining facilities. Other accessory rights relate to the establishment
of easements, 141 utilization of water for mining purposes, and the
capacity to excavate the subsurface of adjoining lands not subject
to a concession.
42
b. Termination of the Concession
A concession may terminate either upon expiration or by forfei-
ture. An exploration concession expires after three years; an ex-
ploitation concession expires after twenty-five years.143 Extensions,
however, are available. A concession terminates by virture of for-
feiture where: (1) taxes imposed upon the concession are not
paid; (2) there is nonperformance of the exploitation4 work as re-
quired; (3) the capital structure of the mining company is altered;
(4) the existence of the substances indicated in the mining title is
not proved; or (5) a mining concession is transferred improperly. 14 5
Where grounds for forfeiture exist, the concessionaire must be
given notice so that he can submit a defense.1 46 If a defense is not
submitted, forfeiture is ordered. Once a concession is forfeited, the
concessionaire may not apply for a concession of that same area for
the executive. OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 9.
13 The validity of a lease is contingent upon the satisfaction of specific conditions. For a
listing of these conditions, see Rocha, supra note 128, at 601-02.
"0 OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 9; Rocha, supra note 128, at 603-04. Where lands are
expropriated, the concessionaire must compensate the owner adequately. Rocha, supra note
128, at 604. A limitation on the right to expropriate is of especial importance to the foreign
investor. "Corporations with foreign capital participation may not acquire land through ex-
propriation of certain [coastal strips deemed] 'prohibited zones.' Under those circumstances
such corporations may request temporary occupation of land." Id. at 604.
... The concessionaire may apply for easements providing for access and the operation of
power and water lines. Rocha, supra note 128, at 604. Where easements are required or
expropriation needed, the amount assigned for compensation must first be deposited with
the Nacional Finaciera, S.A. OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 25.
142 See OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 24.
143 See supra notes 124 & 132 and accompanying text.
"4 Forfeiture by nonperformance is not ordered due to temporary unprofitability, force
majeure, or judicial decisions affecting operations. OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 27. In
general, a concessionaire may prove performance by either verifying that mineral substances
with commercial value were obtained or proving that investments were made directly to
fulfill the concession's objectives. Id. at 30.
Id. at 26-27.
'4a Id. at 27.
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one year. 147
In addition to the possibility of forfeiture, a concession holder
may suffer other severe sanctions for violations of the Mexican
mining laws or regulations. 4 8 These sanctions include fines149 or
imprisonment.'10 The grounds for penalties are provided in regula-
tions to the Mining Law. 51 The foreign investor should be inti-
mately familiar with these regulations so that inadvertent viola-
tions do not occur.
3. The Mining Concession in Peru
The concessions available in Peru are similar to those in Brazil
and Mexico, yet, in a sense they are more specialized. Four kinds
of concessions are available: exploration, exploitation, processing,
and refining. The holder of an exploration concession may conduct
mineral scans for up to five years on a specific tract after the con-
cession is authorized and notice is given to the owners of adjacent
property.6 2 An exploitation concession gives its holder the right to
extract. Upon extraction the minerals become the concessionaire's
property. Frequently, the exploitation concession is used in con-
junction with processing or refining concessions. 5
Each of the above mentioned concessions is granted by the Peru-
vian Ministry of Mines and Energy.15 4 The approval process is ini-
tiated by the applicant who must file in writing to the regional
mining authority (jefatura regional de mineria).55 If the applicant
is a business entity, an additional record must be filed in the pub-
lic register and the public mining register. This record must indi-
147 Id.
... Id. at 40.
"9 The fines range from 500 to 100,000 pesos. Id.
The imprisonment may last from six months to five years. Id. at 41.
'6' Sanctions may be imposed when:
1) substances are exploited without the right to expressly exploit those substances;
2) a concessionaire intentionally disposes of substances not covered by his concession;
3) a concessionaire improperly suspends operations;
4) false reports are submitted; and
5) the ownership status of a mining company is concealed to avoid compliance with Mexi-
can ownership requirements. Id.
"" OAS-Peru, supra note 50, at 8. Specifically the concessionaire may explore up to five
years from notification of the auto de amparo, a document "ordering publication of the
concession grant and notification of" adjacent land owners. Id.
"' Id. at 7. A processing concession empowers its holder to install and operate mineral
processing plants. A refining concession allows for legal refining of mineral substances. Id.
'6' Decree-Law 21,094 at 6.
,6 Id. at 14.
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cate the agent representing the business entity. 56 Where two or
more applicants apply for a concession over the same area, priority
is determined by the temporal order of the applications. 57 Upon
approval of the application the regional mining authority issues a
document (auto de amparo), which orders publication in the offi-
cial federal publication, El Peruano, and in a local newspaper.'58
An exploration concession may be changed to an exploitation con-
cession at any time during the duration of the exploration
concession.'5 9
a. Rights and Obligations of the Concessionaire in Peru
The obligations of the concessionaire may be catagorized as: (1)
fee payments, (2) minimum investment and production require-
ments, and (3) filing of reports. Failure to meet these obligations
results in forfeiture of the concession.'6 " The primary fees are an
application fee (derecho de denucio)'O' and the claim fee (derecho
de tramitacion).162 Installation and refining permits,'63 however,
are also subject to claim fees. The obligations concerning minimum
investment and production are monitored closely by the Peruvian
government and vary signficantly. If minimum investment and
production obligations are not met, the concessionaire must pre-
sent to the Direccion General de Mineria a schedule of operations
including financing sources, investments, and technical drawings.'"
This schedule for exploitation cannot exceed five years'6 5 except
'" Id. Detailed requirements must be fulfilled to acquire a concession. Id.
"5 Id. Where simultaneous application occurs, the applicants resolve the dispute through
competitive bidding. Id.
" This publication allows for adjacent tract owners to be aware of the mining enterprise.
Id.
Id. at 15.
100 Decree-Law 19,441 (June 20, 1972) (Peru), discussed in OAS-Peru, supra note 50, at
10-11.
"' Id. The application fee is an annual 2.50 soles per hectare for an exploration conces-
sion (derecho de denuncio); the application fee for an exploitation concession is three soles
per hectare. Id.
1" Id. The claim fee (derecho de tramitacion) is 220 soles for an exploration concession
and 300 soles for an exploitation concession. Id.
1" See supra note 160.
164 OAS-Peru, supra note 50, at 11-12.
105 The minimum investment is explained as follows:
The minimum annual investment in the period of execution of the plans and initi-
ation of the exploitation will be noted in the schedule of operations presented, and
for the first year it may not be less than 30 percent of the total investment divided
among the number of years programmed. For successive years the balance of the
investment will be paid off as follows: 50 percent of it will be expended by the
[Vol. 14:251
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where justified by delay. Upon expiration of the investment plan,
the minimum production schedule becomes operative." The mini-
mum production schedule is determined statutorily and is revised
and expanded upon the discovery of new reserves on the conces-
sionaire's tract. Reporting requirements indicating fulfillment of
the production schedule are extensive and are enforced strictly.
"Within the first three months following the close of each annual
period of the concession, the concessionaire must present. ..a
technical report on the operations, plans for geographical and
topographical studies and estimates of resources."'1 6 7 In addition to
this annual report, a supplemental report must be given to the
Direccion General de Mineria indicating the mineral reserves and
production after each operating year of the concession. 168
The Peruvian concessionaire's rights may be classified as general
and specific. The general rights'69 are designed to encourage pro-
duction. They include: (1) the capacity to utilize the concession's
surface area and adjoining land for mining purposes; (2) the right
to request easements and to construct installments facilitating ven-
tilation and drainage of the mine; (3) the freedom to expropriate
cultivated surface lands necessary to the concession; 7 and (4) the
right to use any water necessary for the concession. The specific
rights held by a concessionaire enable him to dispose of water and
minerals extracted in the course of mining.' 7 1 Moreover, certain
rights are afforded to concessionaires mining specific substances
such as metallics and carboniferous minerals. 172
b. Termination of the Concession in Peru
In Peru, as in Mexico and Brazil, a concession may be termi-
second year, 60 percent by the third year, 80 percent by the fourth year, and 100
percent by the fifth year. During the minimum investment period, the concession-
aire may request an extension of the schedule for reasons of force majeure. The
mining authority decides upon the request.
Id. at 12.
166 Id.
' Id. at 11. The report must be signed, sworn, and provide the criteria involved in mak-
ing the calculations. Id.
'68 Id. at 11-12. This report must also indicate the method used to calculate the reserves.
Id.
,69 Id. at 9.
1 0 Id. at 8. To expropriate land, the concessionaire must show that the financial advan-
tages conferred by the mining concession outweigh the activity affected. Id.
17, Id. at 9-10.
172 Id. at 10. For a general review of these "specific rights," see id.
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nated through forfeiture. The ultimate decision concerning forfeit-
ures rests with the Direccion General de Mineria, an "arm" of the
executive. An exploration concession is deemed to be forfeited
when: (1) "extension of the time period for exploration or for
conversion...to...[an] exploration is not requested in due time"
or (2) the annual mandatory investment is unsatisfied 7 ' in two
successive years. 174 An exploitation concession may be forfeited in
any one of six ways. The investor should specifically note that for-
feiture of an exploitation concession may occur due to failure to
meet annual investment requirements, failure to initiate produc-
tion in accord with statutory minimums, failure to continue pro-
duction or investment in accord with statutory minimums, or due
to the mere failure to present an operations schedule. 17 Finally,
processing and refining concessions are also subject to forfeiture
upon nonpayment of land tax, failure to place the concessions in
production in a timely manner, or unauthorized stoppage of pro-
duction or withdrawal of production equipment. 76 Upon forfei-
ture, the concessionaire may retain and remove improvements or
fixtures on the property that he installed.177 The state, however,
recovers full ownership of the surface land. 78 In addition to forfei-
ture, surcharges, penalties, or fines may result when a concession-
aire fails to comply with statutory obligations. 17
9
B. Restrictions on Investment
Brazil, Mexico, and Peru each impose restrictions in varying de-
grees on foreign investment in mining. The limitations imposed by
Brazil are the least restrictive. Although the Brazilian constitution
prohibits direct foreign investment in the exploitation of miner-
als, 180 foreigners may organize local subsidiaries to overcome that
," Id. at 13. When the first annual investment is not met, the concessionaire must reim-
burse the state for the amount defaulted. Id.
"I Id. at 11. The concessionaire has available the defense of force majeure. Id.
'7 Id. Other grounds for termination include nonpayment of land tax in two consecutive
years and an express statement by the concessionaire that he will not work in accord with
his schedule of operations. Id.
176 Id.
'7 Id. at 14.
178 Id. Any easements granted are extinguished by law. Id.
,79 Id. See also OAS-Peru, supra note 50.
so CONSTITUICAo FEDERAL (Brazilian Constitution) § 168, discussed in BUSINESS OPERA-
TIONS IN BRAZIL, FOREIGN INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO (BNA), No. 439 at A-5 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as BNA, BRAZIL].
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barrier. 8 1 The Brazilian Mining Code 18 2 reiterates that view under
its definition of "mining enterprise.' 18 3 Mining enterprise is de-
fined as any "firm or company that is organized and domiciled in
Brazil.' 18 4 Thus, its components may be either Brazilian nationals
or foreigners.
The limitations on foreign investment imposed by Mexico are
more restrictive and complex than those of Brazil. Mexico recently
enacted restrictions'8 5 designed to "Mexicanize" its mining indus-
try. 8 6 Under the 1973 Mexican Foreign Investment Laws, the term
"foreign investment" is defined expansively to include investment
by foreign legal entities or individuals, Mexican enterprises with a
majority of foreign capital or in which foreigners are empowered to
control management decisions, and foreign enterprises without a
legal structure. 8 7 In general, concessions for the use and exploita-
tion of minerals may not be held by companies in which the for-
eign participation exceeds forty-nine percent. 8 The Foreign In-
vestment Laws, however, cannot be read in a vacuum. The laws
governing foreign investment provide expressly that where previ-
ous laws exist regulating an industry, those laws shall govern. 89
Regarding mining, regulations promulgated in 1975 and the Min-
ing Law reiterate and expand the restrictions contained in the re-
'8 BNA, BRAZIL, supra note 180, at A-5.
182 OAS-Brazil, supra note 50.
is' Only a "mining enterprise" may exploit minerals. See supra text accompanying notes
89-90.
184 OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 19.
185 MEXICAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY LAWS, supra note 32;
Law Regulating Article 27 of the Constitution (Reglamento de la Ley Regalmentaria del
Articulo 27 Constitucional en Materia Mineral) (Dec. 11, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Mining
Regulations].
"' Dominguez, The Political and Social Aspects of the Mexican Mining Industry, 27A
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 409, 425 (1982). In fact "the mining industry [of Mexico] is totally
Mexicanized today; that is, Mexicans have 51 percent or more of the equity stock in existing
corporations." In addition to the goal of "Mexicanization," the 1973 Mexican Foreign In-
vestment laws were designed to "promote Mexican investment and to regulate foreign in-
vestment to stimulate a just and balanced development [of the Mexican economy]." MEXI-
CAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY LAWS, supra note 32, art. 1.
187 MEXICAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY LAWS, supra note 32,
art. 2.
188 Id. art. 5. Moreover, foreign enterprises may not hold more than a thirty-four percent
interest in "special concessions." Id. A "special concession" is a concession to exploit miner-
als "essential" for Mexico's development. Rocha, supra note 129, at 589. The special conces-
sion holder has the "same rights and obligations as the beneficiary of an ordinary conces-
sion .. " Id.
"' MEXICAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY LAWS, supra note 32,
art. 5.
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cently enacted Foreign Investment Laws. The Mining Law mirrors
the percentage limitations on concession ownership stipulated by
the Foreign Investment Laws, and its regulations indicate by
whom the majority interest may be owned. 190 Moreover, the regula-
tions define precisely the rules governing transferability of shares
held in mining companies. 191 Additional restrictions are imposed
upon transferability, ownership, and voting rights of the various
classes of stock held in a mining enterprise."9 " Minority sharehold-
ers or foreign investors, however, are afforded some protection
from severe majority domination by the establishment of condi-
tions for the validity of resolutions and the ability to be repre-
sented by a director. 193
Peruvian restrictions on foreign investment are contained in De-
cision 24 of the Cartagena Agreement which Peru adopted upon its
entrance into the Andean Common Market. 19 The Andean Com-
mon Market is an integrated community of Latin American coun-
tries who agreed to implement a common regime for the treatment
of foreign capital.195 Under the agreement, individual nations may
l91 In general, the percentage of Mexican national ownership may be held by:
(1) Individuals of Mexican nationality;
(2) Mexican companies whose capital stock is subscribed entirely by Mexicans, or
Mexican companies whose charter excludes foreign participation;
(3) Mexican companies, including development organizations, recorded in the
Public Mining Register, in which the majority of capital stock is subscribed by
Mexican nationals or by Mexican companies, in which the percentage of net mini-
mum Mexican capital is maintained in accordance with the Law of December 11,
1975;
(4) Mexican credit, bonding and insurance institutions, and Mexican investment
companies operating under concessions issued by the Ministry of Finance and
Public Credit, and upon the expressed authorization of the latter;
(5) The Mining Development Commission;
(6) Majority government participation companies. In the case that such companies
have a foreign participation, they must be subject to the provisions of item (3)
above;
(7) Public firms referred to in Article 25 of the Civil Code of the Federal District;
(8) Irrevocable trusts for funds of allotments of shares and retirement plans for
Mexican employees and workers;
(9) Communal lands and agrarian communities, under conditions provided for in
the Federal Agrarian Reform Law.
OAS-Mexico, supra note 5, at 7-8.
' As a general rule shares may not be transferred as a means to side-step the percentage
ownership limitations. Cf. MEXICAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
LAws, supra note 32, art. 5(a).
,92 See Miranda, supra note 117, at 467-69, 472-74.
,,* Id. at 475, 478.
194 See PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1, at 16.
1'5 Ryerson, supra note 45, at 29. The goals of ANCOM were "to exclude foreign invest-
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impose harsher restrictions than those of the community. 196 Thus,
until recently, Peru did not permit foreign investment in its min-
ing sector.19 7 Currently, participation is allowed in certain mining
activities if the mining enterprise maintains at least fifty-one per-
cent local ownership. 9 " Further, prior authorization from and re-
gistration with the Peruvian federal government is required for all
foreign investment. 9 Approval criteria include: (1) whether the
investment comports with Peru's development priorities; (2)
whether existing industry would be hindered by the investment;
and (3) whether the investment would subsume rights owned by
national investors.200 Another restriction of which a foreign inves-
tor must have notice is Peru's request that a "mining community"
be formed after seven years of mining exploitation.20' A mining
community permits the employees to share in after-tax net in-
come. 20 2 The government implemented mining communities to
restructure society "so that a greater proportion of the population
[could] participate in the country's economy" and to "distribute
wealth more evenly among all Peruvians. '203
C. Taxation of the Minerals
A third legal angle that a foreign investor must consider is the
burden taxes will place on the mining activity. The taxation
scheme of Brazil is generally simplistic and predictable, and, for
that reason, is advantageous to the investor. A ten percent tax is
imposed on the officially established value of all minerals ex-
ploited, except coal.204 Coal is taxed at eight percent of officially
established sales prices. In addition, the surface owner receives a
ment from key sectors of ANCOM's economy; (2) to limit foreign participation in local com-
panies to a minority position; and (3) to diminish reliance on foreign technology while en-
hancing local technology." Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30.
1. PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1, at 16.
190 Decree-Law 21,826 (Apr. 1977) (Peru) (modifying Decree-Law 18,900), discussed in
PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1, at 17; Ryerson, supra note 45, at 31.
'99 Ryerson, supra note 45, at 30.
200 Id.
20 Decree-Law 22,333 (Nov. 15, 1978) (Peru), discussed in BNA, PERU, supra note 3, at
28.
202 Id. Regarding foreign mining entities, the workers must receive seven percent of net
income. Id.
203 Cf. PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1, at 10.
214 Decree 55,928 (Apr. 14, 1965) (Brazil), promulgated under Law 4,425, art. 9 (Oct. 8,
1964) (Brazil), discussed in OAS-Brazil, supra note 50, at 7.
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participation tax of ten percent of the mineral tax.205 The Depart-
ment of Internal Revenue of the Ministry of Finance calculates a
mineral's value biannually. As a general rule, the official sales price
equals approximately the "average FOB export price less [forty
percent] at the port of shipment."20 6
Mexico imposes two forms of taxes on mining activity: a tax on
concessions determined by the surface area of the mining tract,
and a production tax. The surface tax is collected annually at the
rate of sixty pesos per hectare for exploitation of metallics and
thirty pesos for nonmetallics. 07 Exploration concessions are taxed
at ten pesos per hectare. 20 8 The production tax is based on a flat
percentage of the official price of the mineral exploited.0 9 Certain
low grade areas are exempt from production taxes as are minerals
recouped from manufactured products.21 0 The official price of a
mineral is determined monthly by the Ministry of Treasury and
Public Credit. 211 Factors considered by the Ministry include the
average quotation of the price within the two previous months
from New York and other foreign markets, and, at times, the Mex-
icans wholesale price of the mineral.
Finally, a concession holder in Peru is neither subjected to a sur-
face tax as in Mexico nor a production tax as in Brazil and Mexico,
but rather to a tax on net income earned according to a progressive
formula.213
205 Id.
20" Id. Where there are no exports during the "six month period, the value is calculated
on the average wholesale price of the product sold on the main consumer markets of Brazil
during the same period, deducting [forty] percent." Id.
117 Law on Taxation and Promotion of Mining (Dec. 30, 1955) (Mexico); Regulation of
Chapter IX of the Law dated Sept. 18, 1975 (Diario Oficial, Dec. 12, 1975), discussed in
OAS-Mexico, supra note 50, at 37; Rocha, supra note 128, at 590.
'0 Rocha, supra note 128, at 590.
20 Law on Taxation and Promotion of Mining, art. 5, discussed in Rocha, supra note 128,
at 609. As of 1982 the rates were:
1) nine percent for gold, silver, and sulphur;
2) four percent for iron, coal, and manganese; and
3) seven percent for any other mineral. Id.
210 Id.
"' Id. at 610.
212 Id.
"I Decree-Law No. 18,880, art. 119 (Peru), discussed in BNA, PERU, supra note 3, at A-
28. For a discussion of this system of taxation, see infra notes 246-48 and accompanying
text.
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III. THE APPROPRIATE INVESTMENT ENTITY
In each nation a variety of organizational entities may be formed
to conduct business operations. The form most appropriate for a
mining venture in each nation, however, is a Sociedad Anonima. A
Sociedad Anonima, sometimes generically referred to as a "corpo-
ration" is conceptually similar to the United States corporate en-
tity.2"4 Each nation imposes its own "minimum requirements" nec-
214 In Mexico, the Corporate Law (Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles) stipulates
which business entities may be formed within Mexico. They are:
1) Sociedad en Nombre Colectivo, which is basically a general partnership;
2) Sociedad an Comandita Simple, which is basically a limited partnership;
3) Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada, a limited liability company;
4) Sociedad Anonima, a corporation; and,
5) Sociedad en Comandita por Acciones.
The Sociedad en Nombre Colectivo is not a suitable investment vehicle because it yields
unlimited joint and several liability for its members. Corporate Law, art. 25 (Mexico). The
Sociedad en Comandita Simple and the Sociedad en Comandita por Acciones "limit the
liability of the 'silent partners,'" particularly foreign partners who are not permitted to
manage a mining company under the Mining Law, "thus imposing a greater financial bur-
den on the active [Mexican] partners." Rocha, supra note 128, at 449. Such a result would
be a violation of the Mexican corporate law because under that statute ". . .the participa-
tions held by Mexicans may not have lesser rights than those held by foreigners." Id. (dis-
cussing Corporate Law, arts. 51, 61, 207 (Mexico)). Thus, they too are unsuitable investment
vehicles. Finally, the Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada must be considered. Its desira-
bility as an investment entity is a closer call. The "limited liability company" may be organ-
ized by no more than 25 equity holders, and the firm's capital may not be represented by
negotiable instruments. See BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN MEXICO FOREIGN INCOME PORTFOLIO
(BNA) A-58 (1981) [hereinafter cited as BNA, MExico[; Rocha, supra note 128, at 449. Both
of these limitations impair, to large extent, the flexibility needed for foreign investment.
Moreover, the limited liability company may potentially result in disadvantageous tax con-
sequences. The limited liability company is not a partnership per se, as it is a separate legal
entity from the individuals forming the company. Thus, in all probability the Internal Reve-
nue Service would not allow such an investment vehicle to be treated as a partnership and
consequently would likely disallow exploration expenditures deducted by United States eq-
uity holders as business expenses. Rocha, supra note 128, at 452.
In Peru, the investment vehicles are basically the same as those offered in Mexico. Again
the Sociedad Colectiva, or general partnership, is not "a wise choice for an investment vehi-
cle because it does not shield liability." Mercantile Law, arts. 25-26 (Peru), discussed in
BNA, PERU, supra note 3, at A-20. The Sociedad en Comandita, or limited partnership, and
the Sociedad en Comandita por Acciones are not appropriate investment vehicles. Both
entities result in the imposition of a greater financial burden upon the active partners and
conceptually afford those partners lesser rights; therefore, utilization of either investment
entity would violate rules establishing the Andean Common Market of which Peru is a
member. In the Andean Common Market new foreign investment may be made in "na-
tional" enterprises, in which more than 80% of the capital is owned by national investors, or
in "mixed" enterprises, in which 51 to 80% of the capital is owned by foreign investors.
Ryerson, supra note 45, at 30-32. This regulation implicitly requires that the proportionate
share of management control must be given to nationals as well. Id. The Sociedad de Re-
sponsabilidad Limitada, as mentioned above, creates unneeded potential tax burdens.
Finally, in Brazil, the forms of doing business again do not differ substantially from those
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essary to form a Sociedad Anonima. From the outset, the foreign
investor must be cognizant of those requirements to ensure both
the formation of the Sociedad Anonima and the smooth proceed-
ing of its ensuing business. In Brazil, the organization and func-
tioning of such "corporations" are regulated by Law No. 6.404
(1976).2"1 Three threshold requirements must be met to form the
Brazilian "corporation." First, the corporate shares must be sub-
scribed by at least two persons into which the corporate capital is
divided. Second, payment of at least ten percent of the shares' sub-
scription price must be tendered immediately; and third, the de-
posit of the initial payment must be made with Banco do Brasil or
another bank approved by the Securities Exchange Commission.21
The Sociedad Anonima may be formed by a public or private sub-
scription of its shares. The formation costs usually do not exceed
$500-$1,500. 21 7 Brazil imposes neither a minimum share capital re-
quirement nor a statutory maximum number of shareholders.2 18
Such flexibility affords the foreign investor wide latitude to struc-
ture the corporate entity in a way most beneficial to individual cir-
cumstances. The governance of a Brazilian "corporation" must be
stipulated in the entity's by-laws. In general, "[a] corporation's by-
laws must establish who is responsible for its administration which
may be through an administrative council and a board of directors
or only through a board of directors. '21 9 The Sociedad Anonima is
also a proper business entity to utilize in a joint venture with a
Brazilian enterprise or the Brazilian government. 220 This is signifi-
cant to the foreign investor because such concerted efforts cur-
rently are favored by the Brazilian government.22' The corporate
available in either Mexico or Peru. See BNA, BRAZIL, supra note 180, at A-7. The reasoning
above, therefore, is applicable equally to the Brazilian context with two minor exceptions.
First, while Brazil does not impose the national "control" requirements as do Mexico and
Peru, available limited partnership vehicles such as Sociedad en Comandita Simple and
Sociedad en Comandita por Acciones, do not offer the same flexibility of a corporate entity
and, therefore, are not the optimal business form. Second, the Brazilian government encour-
ages joint ventures between itself and foreign investors; thus, that mode of conducting busi-
ness must be considered. The joint venture in Brazil is attained generally by capital associa-
tion formed through a corporation. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 39.
215 See BNA, BRAZIL supra note 180, at A-7; PRICE WATERHOUSE, BRAZIL, supra note 1, at
23.
116 BNA, BRAZIL, supra note 180, at A-23.
217 Id.
"a PRICE WATERHOUSE, BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 25-26.
119 Id. at 26.
'20 Id. at 39.
221 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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income tax imposed by Brazil is not oppressive. As a general prin-
ciple, the tax is assessed on the net income resulting from profits
arising from activities carried out within Brazil. 222 A tax, therefore,
is not imposed on income stemming from sources outside of Brazil.
Income resulting from the exploitation of minerals in Brazil which
are to be sold, processed, or used abroad are deemed to result from
activities conducted within and without Brazil. 223 If income is not
clearly apportionable, the entity is taxed on twenty percent of its
gross receipts.224 This rate should be compared with the general
corporate tax rate, which as of 1979 was thirty-five percent.225
The requirements for the formation of a Sociedad Anonima in
Mexico are similar to those of Brazil, although in Mexico prior au-
thorization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is required to estab-
lish a corporation.226 "A minimum of five incorporators is required
[to form] a corporation, and each must subscribe at least one share
of stock. '227 At all times the corporation must maintain this mini-
mum number of shareholders; otherwise, it will be deemed to be
dissolved.228 There is no limit as to the maximum number of share-
holders. Special requirements, in addition to the previously men-
tioned general requirements, must be met before a corporation
with foreign stockholders will be authorized in Mexico. That is,
each foreign stockholder must agree: "(1) to consider himself a
Mexican insofar as his shares of stock or other interests in the cor-
poration are concerned and (2) not to invoke the protection of his
government under penalty should he fail to keep his agreement, of
forfeiting such shares or interests to the Mexican Nation. '22 9 Upon
authorization of the Sociedad Anonima, a minimum of 25,000 pe-
sos of capital must be "paid in."'230 If authorized capital stock ex-
ceeds that amount, twenty percent must be paid immediately.231
Generally, the formation of a new Mexican corporation requires
three to four weeks, and total cost including legal and notarial fees
122 Federal Decree-Law No. 4506, § 63 (1964), discussed in BNA, BRAZIL, supra note 181,
at A-29.
223 Id.
224 Id.
22 PRICE WATERHOUSE, BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 75.
226 PRICE WATERHOUSE, MEXICO, supra note 1, at 54.
227 BNA, MEXICO, supra note 214, at A-59.
228 Id.
229 Id.
210 PRICE WATERHOUSE, MEXICO, supra note 1, at 54.
221 Id.
1984]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
is 100,000 pesos.2 32
The relationship between minority shareholders, which by law
must be foreigners, 3 and majority shareholders is of importance
to the foreign investor. Under Mexican law, a minority shareholder
rarely has legal recourse against a majority decision, as the "share-
holders in [a] general meeting are the supreme authority of a
corporation. "2134
The Mexican taxation system differs somewhat from that of
Brazil. First, the tax is levied as a percentage of gross income.2
35
The tax rate on corporations ranges from three to thirty percent.23 6
Moreover, all foreign source income of a Mexican corporation is
taxed.231 Thus, the advantage of apportionment available in Brazil
is not conferred by Mexico. In addition to its gross income tax,
Mexico recently enacted a value added tax on six percent of sales,
which is applicable to mining enterprises. "[T]his tax must be paid
by the buyer of mining concessions at the time the sale is made for
the total amount of the price. .... "238 Although the tax burdens
imposed by Mexico are sign ificant, an executive order was pub-
lished on January 15, 1981, establishing tax incentives to promote
investment in the mining industry.23 9 These incentives should help
assuage an investor's fears of being overly taxed. Tax incentives
relevant to foreign investment include but are not limited to subsi-
dies offsetting exploration and development expenses, a reduction
of import duties on equipment, and accelerated depreciation and
amortization under certain circumstances.240
The formation of the "corporate" entity in Peru is relatively
simple and for that reason is the most common form used by for-
eign entities to conduct business there.241 The Sociedad Anonima
may be formed publicly or privately,242 but in either case there
" Id.
2" See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
'3' PRICE WATERHOUSE, MEXICO, supra note 1, at 56.
23 Income Tax Law, art. 43, para. 1 (Mexico), discussed in BNA, MEXICO, supra note
214, at A-11.
236 Id. arts. 33, 43.
2s1 PRICE WATERHOUSE, MExIco, supra note 1, at 92.
238 Rocha, supra note 128, at 612.
... PRICE WATERHOUSE, MEXICO, supra note 1, at 145.
240 See id. for a general review of the benefits granted and eligibility requirements of
these incentives.
2 PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1, at 30.
242 Mercantile Law (Ley de Sociedades Mercantiles), arts. 70-101 (July 1966), discussed
in BNA, PERU, supra note 3, at A-20.
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must be at least three shareholders.243 A foreign enterprise such as
a subsidiary must obtain special authorization to do business from
CONITE, the official office in charge of controlling foreign invest-
ment, and it must register its capital with that office; otherwise
official authorizations are not generally required for the formation
of a commercial enterprise.244 Regarding capital, "a minimum of
twenty-five percent of the subscribed capital must be paid up
before a corporation [may] be legally declared constituted. 2 5
Control of the Peruvian corporation is reviewed by the sharehold-
ers while business conduct is delegated to a board of at least two
directors and the corporate officers. 246 The taxation of entities
holding mining concessions in Peru is unique. Concession holders
pay only a progressive income tax, which exempts them from all
other taxes.2 47 Moreover, the purchase of mining concessions may
be amortized over a maximum of ten years for tax purposes.24 8
Other tax incentives available to stimulate growth in the mining
industry include an annual 100 percent write-off for certain invest-
ments in tax assets and tax-free investments up to certain maxi-
mum limits.249
IV. OTHER FINANCIAL CONCERNS OF THE INVESTOR:
REPATRIATION OF EARNINGS AND REGISTRATION OF CAPITAL
A. Brazil
Brazilian law requires the registration of foreign capital and
243 Id.
..4 PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1, at 27.
245 Id. at 32.
24 Id. at 33.
247 Decree-Law 18,880, art. 119 (Peru), discussed in BNA, PERU, supra note 3, at A-28.
Peruvian mining companies are taxed according to the following regime:
Taxable Income
Over Not Over Tax on Percentage
(Column 1) Column 1 on excess
- S/. 100,000 - 20
S/. 100,000 500,000 S/. 20,000 30
500,000 50,000,000 140,000 35
50,000,000 100,000,000 17,465,000 40
"Any excess over S/. 100,000,000 is subject to proportional scale rate from 37.5% to 65%
varying on the gross yield of the mining investment." Id. Decree-Law 18,880, art. 119
(Peru), discussed in BNA, PERU, supra note 3, at A-i; see also PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU,
supra note 1, at 115.
24" PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1, at 84.
249 Id.
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loans.2 50 Moreover, specific requirements are imposed to qualify for
remittance of profits. Foreign investment capital must be regis-
tered with the Central Bank of Brazil (Banco do Brasil), and any
new investments or increases must be reported to the Central
Bank within thirty days.25' The Brazilian government is empow-
ered to levy surcharges on remittances of up to fifty percent of the
amount remitted.2 52 No such levies, however, have been imposed
since 1966.253 "Capital may be repatriated without payment of
taxes up to the amount registered in foreign currency with the
Central Bank. 2 54
B. Mexico
Mexico does not require the registration of foreign capital.2 55
Thus, proof of registration or of having brought foreign currency
into Mexico is not needed when making currency purchases with
pesos.2 56 The Mexican government, however, offers no guarantees
against inconvertability. 257
C. Peru
As a member of the Andean Common Market, Peru imposes
those restrictions authorized by Decision 24 of the Cartagena
Agreement.258 Under that agreement, foreign investment must be
preauthorized and registered with the Comision Nacional de In-
vestiones y Technologies Entrenjeras.2 59 In addition, the reinvest-
ment of profits by foreign entities is considered a new investment
requiring reauthorization and reregistration.20° In regard to the re-
patriation of capital and earnings, the agreement provides that
"the conversion of funds that foreign investors are entitled to repa-
triate must be made at the rate of exchange in effect on the date of
250 Law No. 4131 (Sept. 1982) (Brazil), discussed in PRICE WATERHOUSE, BRAZIL, supra
note 1, at 11.
251 Id.
255 PRICE WATERHOUSE, BRAZIL, supra note 1, at 12.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 PRICE WATERHOUSE, MEXICO, supra note 1, at 19.
5' Id.
257 Id.
25 Decree-Law No. 18,900 (July 1971) was the Peruvian statute that adopted the tenets
of the Cartagena Agreement of the Andean Common Market.
2 5 This agency is referred to as CONITE and is empowered specifically to control foreign
investment and remittance of profits abroad. PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1, at 19.
2. Id. at 20.
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remittance." '261 Further, foreign investors may generally transfer
abroad up to twenty percent of their approved foreign
investment.2"2
V. CONCLUSION
In general, a decision to invest in the mining industry of Mexico,
Peru, or Brazil must be scrutinized. Among the factors to be con-
sidered are the current political climate and past history6 3 of for-
eign investment within each country, the applicable mining laws,2 64
and the effect of taxation 265 on the investment's potential rate of
return. Each nation's mining sector is controlled paternally by its
federal government. To the foreign investor, this means that the
ultimate decision as to whether a concession will be granted or for-
feited rests in the hands of a select few. Under the mining laws of
Mexico, Peru, and Brazil a profitable concession may be forfeited
by the mere noncompliance with statutory formalities. 26 Even
where good faith attempts at compliance are made, forfeiture is,
nevertheless, a possibility under the broad and often ambiguous
language of the statutes.2 7 Moreover, where a forfeiture occurs, the
foreign investor will in all probability lack recourse because Latin
American countries apply the Calvo doctrine.28" Thus, the preser-
vation and, therefore, profitability of a mining venture in Mexico,
Peru, and Brazil is grounded in discretion. An investor must "play
its political cards" with skill and verve to succeed.269
Deciding the arena in which to play those cards is a difficult de-
cision to resolve. While Peru may contain the largest amount of
untapped resources, an immediate decision to invest may be hasty.
First, the political stability of Peru is questionable. While Peru
is currently relatively stable, its history is fraught with wild swings
261 Id.
.2 Decree-Law 21,826 (Apr. 1977) (Peru) (adopting Decision 103 of the Cartagena Agree-
ment), discussed in PRICE WATERHOUSE, PERU, supra note 1.
263 See supra notes 8-48 and accompanying text.
264 See supra section II.
262 See supra notes 204-13 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text for discussion of applicable Brazilian
law, notes 144-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mexican law, and notes 173-76
'and accompanying text for a discussion of the Peruvian statutes.
267 See id.
28 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 115.
270 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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between civilian and military governments.2 71 During times of po-
litical instability, Peru's economy suffered concomitantly and
likely would do so in the future under similar circumstances.2 72 In
addition, Peru's status as a member of the Andean Common Mar-
ket (ANCOM) may be reason for the foreign investor to pause.
ANCOM imposes tight restrictions on foreign investment in min-
ing;273 and while those restrictions when isolated may not be signif-
icant enough to deter investment, the general tenor of ANCOM as
a regime very well could be prohibitive. As one scholar
stated: "Given the ambiguity of the Regime and the difference in
its implementation by the member countries, a foreign investor
might indeed reconsider his interest in investing in ANCOM coun-
tries and choose to remain at home. ' 27 4 Significantly, Peru is one
member country that has consistently implemented restrictions
tighter than those necessary under the ANCOM agreement. 275 Fi-
nally, from a pragmatic economic standpoint, a foreign investor
seeking some type of long-term return should realize that the Pe-
ruvian requirement of establishing mining communities, in which
the workers share in profits, will decrease its return.276 On the posi-
tive side, Peru offers an understandable tax scheme, 77 some in-
vestment incentives,2 7 and a qualitatively easy method to estab-
lish a business entity2 79 suitable for mining investment. On a
ledger, however, investment in Peru, compared with Brazil or Mex-
ico, would most likely be disadvantageous to the foreign investor.
Mexico is a more logical nation in which to invest than Peru, but
Mexico also may be far from safe. Politically and historically Mex-
ico has exhibited great stability, yet its economy has not re-
sponded.20 Recently, Mexico demonstrated a tendency to shun
United States investment while nationalizing its economy.281 Both
its Mining Code and Foreign Investment laws require Mexican na-
tionals to own a majority of any mining enterprise. 282 Further, the
271 Id.
:71 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
:74 Ryerson, supra note 45, at 34.
711 See id.
:76 See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
277 See supra notes 213, 249-51 and accompanying text.
:78 See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
71' See supra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
:so See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
"a See supra notes 31-35, 186-93 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
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minority shareholders have little recourse against a strong-willed
national majority. 83 In addition, the laws governing mining con-
cessions are not conducive to long-term investment. An exploita-
tion concession may cover only a small tract of land, 84 and upon
expiration the concession may be renewed, but subject to further
"Mexicanization" restrictions.285 The tax burden imposed by Mex-
ico is significant and growing.286 Mexico does not allocate foreign
source income to its earning base. While the same income is gener-
ally not subject to United States taxation, 87 it may be taxed on a
higher rate in Mexico. Investment in the Mexican mining sector is
not, however, without advantages. Its proximity to the United
States offers logistical advantages compared with Brazil and Peru.
In addition, while Mexico sought to nationalize its economy, it si-
multaneously and paradoxically enacted tax incentives to spur in-
vestment.288 As a result of these seemingly conflicting measures,
great difficulty exists in predicting the direction in which the Mex-
ican government will steer its economy, pro-foreign investment or
otherwise.
The least problematic nation of the three in which to invest is
Brazil. The current Brazilian government is politically stable, ex-
hibiting a direct and positive approach toward United States in-
vestment. In fact, the government encourages foreign investment
through Brazilian controlled joint ventures.28 9 Most importantly,
ownership restrictions are not placed on mining enterprises; they
need only be organized and domiciled in Brazil. 90 Thus, the in-
vestment restrictions imposed by Brazil are far less onerous than
those of Mexico and Peru. As a result of being entitled to complete
ownership, the foreign investor can maximize profitability. Brazil-
ian taxation of mining is based upon a flat rate,2 91 which ensures
predictability. Thus, the Brazilian taxation scheme permits long-
range planning, again benefitting the investor. The Brazilian cor-
183 See supra text accompanying notes 192-93.
18, See Rocha, supra note 128, at 587. The maximum size of the tract is 500 hectares. Id.
Five hundred hectares is approximately 1,250 acres. See WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY
1154 (2d ed. 1953).
181 See supra note 132.
188 See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
18, See ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
188 See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
, See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
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porate profits tax likewise is not complex. 2 It also permits an in-
vestor to plan expenditures.2 93 These considerations indicate that
Brazil's mining sector is objectively the least problematic in which
to invest.
Despite objective criteria, the best investment opportunity may
depend, in the long run, upon who is the foreign investor's business
partner. In Mexico and Peru, foreigners may not participate in
mining except as equity owners or shareholders of a national min-
ing company. By contrast, Brazil does not impose such restrictions;
nevertheless, the selection of an appropriate business partner is
relevant because the Brazilian government encourages Brazilian
controlled joint ventures. Potential business partners include: (1)
the government; (2) large mining companies; (3) large investment
groups; (4) private banks; and (5) smaller mining companies.294
Before deciding on an investment partner, an initial investigation
and audit must be conducted. Ideally, a potential co-partner's ex-
pertise should not be limited to mining but should also include
corporate matters. 95
A business venture with the government is not the best arrange-
ment. First, because a government's composition changes regularly,
differing political and business philosophies could emerge, hamper-
ing communications and hindering any long-range planning.296 Sec-
ond, the government may decide business matters based upon po-
litical considerations rather than profit motives. 7
Large mining companies are also disadvantageous to the foreign
investor. They offer the advantages of experience, qualified person-
nel, and sufficient funding for a mining venture. Their size, how-
ever, in and of itself, delimits their utility as a foreign investment
partner. For example, large mining companies are affiliated fre-
quently with other foreign partners, thereby potentially creating
conflicts of interests.2 98 Further, because of their size such compa-
nies usually have established general behavioral guidelines which
may inhibit flexibility to meet an individual partner's needs and
292 Miranda, supra note 117, at 540.
' Id. at 537.
294 Id.
2'9 Id. at 543.
2" Id. at 541. For example, the French government shifted from a free market to socialist
philosophy. Id.
297 Id.
299 Id. at 542.
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objectives. '99 The problems associated with large mining companies
are also inherent in large investment groups, and for that reason
they too should be avoided.300
Private banks are feasible investment parnters but are not with-
out problems. First, if the bank is already affiliated with a mining
company, the conflict of interest spectre may appear. A second
problem inherent in utilizing a bank as an investment partner is
the possibility that the bank may be unable to match investment
expenditures with its partner.301 These problems, however, are not
insurmountable. A private bank as an investment partner should
not be ruled out.
The best business partner is a small or medium-sized mining
company. These companies offer experience, and they can estab-
lish projects within a short period of time because they are usually
already in possession of mineral deposits requiring additional ex-
ploration and exploitation. 02 What the small mining companies
lack, whether it be modern technology or additional financing, the
United States investor can provide. These smaller companies "usu-
ally not only permit, but demand, that the foreign partner take an
active role, within the limits of the law, to assist both in the tech-
nical and management aspects of the joint venture .. . 303 Inter-
est in smaller companies is obtained usually through an option to
purchase securities or "by investing additional capital for the issu-
ance of new shares. '3 0 4
In short, the structuring of an investment mining venture in
Mexico, Brazil, or Peru may be described as a puzzle that may be
assembled in a myriad of ways. Unfortunately, it is difficult to de-
termine whether the puzzle is constructed properly until it is oper-
ative. Thus, decisions to invest in the mining sectors of Brazil,
Mexico, or Peru must be well researched, and even then such an
investment may be nothing more than a sophisticated roll of the
dice.
299 Id.
"00 Id. at 542-43.
'' Id. at 544.
.0. Id. at 546.
SoS Id. at 547.
8' Id. at 546-47. In addition to the option, small mining companies usually require that
exploration costs be paid by the foreign company during the period of the option. Id. at 547.
Further, "it is not uncommon for the mining company to request a premium to be paid
upon acquisition of the equity interest." Id.
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